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SUBJECT: RESULTS OF G-8 COUNTERTERRORISM ACTION GROUP
MEETING IN AMMAN

REF: SECSTATE 14279

SUMMARY

1. (SBU) DCM on February 5 hosted a discussion ref agenda items in preparation for the G-8 Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) meeting in Washington on February 20. Participants were counterparts from G-8 missions in Amman, in addition to representatives of interested states and organizations (Australia, Spain, and the European Union; Swiss were unavailable). They provided snapshots of their country's counterterrorism support for Jordan, helped identify possible overlaps in training and other assistance, and highlighted areas for possible future assistance under CTAG auspices. Participants reacted favorably to the U.S. proposal to explore the feasibility of helping Jordan create a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to track and ultimately disrupt terrorist and criminal financial flows. Along this vein, Post is arranging a meeting with Central Bank authorities to discuss Jordan's current practices and identify specific needs in this regard. End Summary.

CT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR JORDAN

2. (SBU) DCM on February 5 convened his counterparts from G-8 missions in Amman, in addition to representatives from other countries and organizations, for a discussion of ref agenda items in advance of the Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) meeting in Washington on February 20. The DCM led the discussion with a brief summary of U.S. training and assistance to support Jordan's counterterrorism program. He noted that U.S. support for Jordan over the last year has included training on WMD awareness, mail security, and airport security management. The U.S. is also working to help improve Jordan's border patrol operations and its crisis response practices. Other courses during FY2004 include International Money Laundering, Post-Bomb Blast Crime Scene Investigations, and Public Corruption.

3. (SBU) The French DCM noted his country maintains a very strong cooperative counterterrorism relationship -- mainly operational -- with Jordanian authorities. The French have provided training courses in maritime security as well as others for the PSD. The British also have a strong operational cooperative relationship with all three elements of Jordan's intelligence apparatus -- PSD, GID, and military intelligence -- and the U.K. is looking to expand its training program as it expects additional funding in the near future for new projects and is working on a aviation security assessment, according to the British DCM. Jordanian officials also will participate in an upcoming conference in March in Dubai about transportation security.

4. (SBU) The British DCM said his mission is struggling to get a better handle on Jordanian interagency coordination on CT matters, which they assess is poor. In the end, it works, he said, because one of the three agencies usually takes over and works a problem to its resolution. The U.K. has provided improvised explosive device disposal training. It has not held a hostage rescue course in the last two years but is hoping to renew the program.

5. (SBU) The Canadians also maintain a good operational relationship and have provided significant technical assistance in the past. Its maritime security assistance program has been stalled for the last two years for unrelated political reasons but there is discussion about its resumption. He suggested that Canada might be in a good position to help create a database for CTAG participants to catalogue and update ongoing CT programs, as well as to offer technical assistance on the financial side.

6. (SBU) The EU representative mentioned that the Jordanians had requested assistance in upgrading an unspecified system designed to fight corruption and money laundering. The Spanish representative presented the meeting with a copy of the Madrid Declaration that recognizes the needs of victims of terrorism.

NO KNOWN ASSESSMENTS OF JORDAN'S CT NEEDS

17. (U) None of the participants were able to identify any assessment conducted by CTAG donor countries, other donor countries, or international organizations about Jordan's CT-related needs.

AREAS OF OVERLAP

18. (SBU) Participants discussed potential areas of overlapping assistance, such as in the area of border security. The Japanese DCM noted that his country was in the final stages of negotiating an agreement to provide Jordan with vehicles for border security. Noting that several colleagues had noted during their presentations programs to help improve Jordan's border security, he expressed concern of possible duplication of efforts. The British DCM mentioned that NATO had discussed providing assistance based on a list of requirements for Jordan, but it does not yet have a training budget. NATO sent a team to Jordan to assess Jordan's needs, but because of the slow process perhaps CTAG would be a better venue through which to provide such assistance. Post requests that the U.S. NATO mission in Brussels inquire about potential NATO assistance in this area.

FUTURE CT ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS

19. (SBU) Participants discussed Jordan's CT needs that are not being addressed by ongoing or planned CT assistance. Participants responded favorably to the U.S. proposal to explore the potential feasibility of helping Jordan create a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Jordan to track and ultimately disrupt terrorist financial flows. Post provided attendees with background information on FIUs, and offered to arrange a meeting with financial experts in Jordan's Central Bank to discuss the idea further. Participants agreed that Jordanian involvement in the process is essential, particularly given the covert nature of many bilateral counterterrorism programs, to identify overlaps as well as gaps in assistance. With regard to the FIU, the group deemed it essential to work closely with the Jordanians to understand the extent of the problem here in Jordan, determine what system is currently in place to detect and disrupt terrorist and criminal financial flows, and Jordan's specific needs in this area. The goal, of course, is to avoid creating a duplicate bureaucracy fighting the problem in Jordan.

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